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Abstract
This paper shows that stakeholders’ multilateral opportunistic behaviour during ﬁnan-
cial distress may lead to premature liquidation of the ﬁrm. Consequently, the ﬁrm will
use its capital structure to mitigate the costs of such opportunism. Speciﬁcally, the ﬁrm
will reduce its debt so that the probability of multilateral opportunism is zero; namely, it
will use only safe debt. The paper predicts that the debt-equity ratio will decrease with
risk, the number of contracts, the diﬃculty in writing them and in achieving franchising
arrangements, the supplier’s importance in opportunistic coalitions and a decrease in the
ﬁrm’s size, or the supplier’s adjustment costs.
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01 Introduction
A vast literature on capital structure examines the interactions between real and ﬁnancial
markets. A common theme in this literature is that a ﬁrm may use its capital structure as
an instrument to deal with various imperfections arising from agency problems, informational
asymmetries, regulation, non-competitive markets, unions, etc.1
More recently, the stakeholder theory of capital structure has been discussed in several the-
oretical and empirical studies.2 The basic idea behind this theory is that a ﬁrm is, essentially,
the collection of its stakeholders (workers, suppliers, creditors, customers, equity holders, etc.)
and the relationships among them. The stakeholder theory asserts that the ﬁnancial decision
aﬀects the relationships among these stakeholders, thus aﬀecting the value of the ﬁrm. For
example, Titman (1984) argued that, due to “switching costs” (e.g., the costs of locating new
business partners), the liquidation of a bankrupt ﬁrm hurts long term prospects of its suppliers
and customers.3 Naturally, these costs will be taken into account by the suppliers and customers.
Consequently, the volume of business with highly leveraged ﬁrms which are exposed to bank-
ruptcy risk will be reduced in the presence of such switching costs. The fear of losing long term
relationships due to post-bankruptcy switching costs, in turn, will prompt some ﬁrms to reduce
levels of debt.
Following Titman (1984), the role of ﬁnancing decisions in shaping relationships and bargain-
ing power among stakeholders has been extensively discussed in the literature (see references in
footnote 2). Most of the theoretical papers in this area focus on the impact of debt ﬁnancing
on stakeholders’ bargaining power in the case of bankruptcy and liquidation. A common feature
in this literature is that each stakeholder acts alone to formulate strategic plans. The possible
formation of coalitions of stakeholders is, therefore, not recognized in the analysis of a ﬁrm’s
choice of its capital structure.
In reality, however, alliances are often attractive. By its mere size and leverage, a coalition of
stakeholders may be able to attain more power and hence extract greater beneﬁts than individual
stakeholders can. The emergence of stakeholders’ coalitions and their consequences for the ﬁrm
b e c o m e sm o s ti m p o r t a n ti nt h ef a c eo fb a n k r u p t c y ,o re v e nt h em e r epossibility of bankruptcy4.
Furthermore, as is well known, when agents cannot write complete contracts, switching costs and
speciﬁc investments may create hold-up problems which may lead to opportunistic behaviour in
“long term relationships” (see, for example, Hart (1995)).5 Such hold-up problems become much
1The earlier literature on this subject began with Jensen and Meckling (1976) and was developed by a series
of papers in the 80s and 90s. See Harris and Raviv (1991) and Allen and Winton (1995) for an early summary of
this literature. For a more recent survey see Frank and Goyal (2008).
2The following represents a small part of the growing literature in this area. Bronars and Deree (1991),
Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993), Perotti and Spier (1993), Hennessy and Livdan (2009) and Matsa (2009) provide
theoretical analysis, whereas Titman and Wessels (1988), Kale and Shahrur (2007) and Banerjee, Dasugupta and
Kim (2008), among others, provide empirical studies of the prevalance of low levels of debt. For a recent survey
of this literature, see Parsons and Titman (2008).
3The implications of switching costs and speciﬁc investments were ﬁrst introduced in the Industrial Organiza-
tion literature. See, for example, Williamson (1975).
4In fact, as will be shown below, a coalition may even be able to force an opportunistic bankruptcy.
5See also Hart and Moore (1998) who discuss a model of incomplete contracts with default and renegotiations,
1more important and diﬃcult to deal with in multilateral relationships. First of all, with multiple
contracts, it is necessary to take into account the interactions of all contractual arrangements
between the parties. Second, and more interesting, with multiple contracting parties we may face
multilateral opportunistic behaviour.6 For example, under certain circumstances, opportunistic
behaviour may lead some of the parties to form a coalition whose aim is to exploit the excluded
parties.7 This implies that two new diﬃculties need to be addressed: (i) opportunistic coalitions
may not be easy to prevent and (ii) initial contract cannot include, or specify, the terms of
a potential future contract between the members of a defectors’ coalition.8 In this sense, the
inability to control (defectors’) potential future contracts, makes initial contracts among the
parties “more incomplete”. Consequently, eﬃciency is harder to achieve.
The primary objective of this paper is to introduce the possibility of the formation of oppor-
tunistic coalitions and to examine the impact on the choice of capital structure. The paper shows
that multilateral opportunistic behaviour and the consequent ex-post conﬂicts among groups of
stakeholders, especially in times of ﬁnancial distress, introduce a previously unrecognized cost of
debt ﬁnancing, thus aﬀecting the choice of capital structure. This is a novel source of endogenous
bankruptcy costs associated with debt ﬁnancing which has not been identiﬁed in the literature;
it is the direct consequence of the possibility of multilateral opportunistic behavior.
Our model is partially motivated by numerous examples in which such coalitions were actually
formed. One of the most commonly cited examples is the case of the Olympia and York Inc.
Olympia and York ﬁled for Chapter 11 bankruptcy, but a breakaway coalition of creditors,
suppliers and other initial stakeholders took over the Canary Wharf venture in London, UK, and
eventually drove out its original equity holders.
Other instances of opportunistic behaviour, bargaining and conﬂicts among sub-groups of
stakeholders (which, at times, resulted in strategic bankruptcy) include the following: (i) the
tussles involving LTV and its senior and junior creditors ( NY Times, February, 15, 1992), (ii) the
opportunistic multiple party bankruptcy bargaining, involving Wheeling-Pittsburgh Steel Cor-
poration, its United Steelworkers of America workers and its creditors, (iii) the case of Campeau
where suppliers pulled the plug and triggered bankruptcy (NY Times January 9, 1990), (iv) the
recent case of GM, where a debt-equity swap deal was initially rejected by a tough bargaining
position by creditors and unions (The Wall Street Journal, May, 28, 2009), can also be viewed
where the lender has foreclosure rights. They show that it is possible that the entrepreneur may not be able to
prevent foreclosure in some situations. Other related papers are: Chiu (1998), who shows that with an incomplete
contract, the possibility of loss of ownership may actually increase the asset loser’s investment incentive and
Che and Hausch (1999) who look at “cooperative” investment and show that with unavoidable renegotiations,
contracting may be abandoned altogether.
6And of course, informational asymmetries make the problem much more complex. Since this paper assumes
symmetric information, we do not pursue this here.
7The problem of multilateral opportunistic behaviour is closely related to the general question of equilibrium
coalition formation. Speciﬁcally, in a multilateral contracting environment, a coalition’s payoﬀ often depends on
its composition, as well as the composition of its complement. This is referred to as the problem of “externalities”.
At this point, there is no general model in the literature on coalition formation that adequately deals with such
externalities. For a discussion see: Bloch, F. (1996), Shenoy (1979), Yi (1997), Ray and Vohra (1999), Ray (2007).
For a discussion of externalities in the context of multiple contracts, see Segal (1999).
8In the same way that a (ﬁrst) marriage contract cannot specify the terms of a potential future (second)
marriage contract (that will be signed if the ﬁrst marriage breaks down and the parties re-marry).
2as implicit coalitional bargaining between parties in times of distress, (v) the case of Skeena
Cellulose Inc., that after severe ﬁnancial woes, partially attributed to a creditors-labour coali-
tion, was taken over by its creditors, who later formed a joint venture with the BC government
(as the majority stakeholder, thus in a sense, it was bailed out by the taxpayers)9 and (vi) the
1982 Johns-Manville (a major asbestos manufacturer), declaration of insolvency in order to avoid
paying claims resulting from exposure to its products.10
To examine the impact of possible opportunistic coalitions on the ﬁrm’s capital structure, we
examine the ﬁrm’s decisions within the framework of a multi-stage contracting game between
equity holders, debt holders and a “supplier” of a non-contractible, ﬁrm-speciﬁc input.11 While
equity holders sign an complete contract with creditors, the contractual arrangement with sup-
pliers is incomplete. The incompleteness of the contract with the supplier is due to three related
problems. Namely, the ﬁrm’s inability to: (i) specify what/how much will be supplied, (ii) ex-
clude the possibility of an opportunistic coalition with debt holders, (iii) control the outcome
(contract) in a (potential future) supplier/debt holders opportunistic coalition.
We examine the nature of the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of the contracting game
and show that the ﬁrm will, indeed, use its capital structure to reduce the cost of opportunistic
behaviour by its multiple contracting parties. We show that a lower debt reduces the probability
of an opportunistic supplier/debt holders coalition, thus reducing the cost of the incompleteness.
This, in turn, provides the supplier with a stronger incentives to supply the correct level of the
ﬁrm-speciﬁc input.
Our main conclusion is, therefore, that when a ﬁrm depends on its stakeholders for procure-
ment of crucial, non-substitutable inputs, which are not completely contractible and hence can
lead to opportunistic coalitions, the use of debt becomes less attractive. Consequently, equity
holders may either avoid issuing debt as a source of external ﬁnancing, or at best they will
maintain a lower debt-equity ratio. Our conclusion is in accord with the empirical literature.12
The mechanism that creates a bias against the use of debt is intuitively very simple. A ﬁrm’s
suppliers of scarce, ﬁrm-speciﬁc, non-substitutable and non-contractible inputs are, eﬀectively,
9Upon insolvency, Skeena Cellulose Inc’s ownership was transferred to Royal Bank and TD Bank. The Royal
Bank did not want to be involved in operating Skeena, and was willing to sell its shares in the company. Eventually,
after what seemed to be a controversial decision, the BC Government became a major stakeholder in a joint venture
with the TD Bank, known as SCI Ventures. The BC government ﬁrst became involved with Skeena Cellulose Inc
in the 1997/98 ﬁscal year.
10Continental Airlines’ use of strategic bankruptcy threats to extract union concessions and Texaco’s, attempts
to use strategic insolvency to avoid damages payments to its archrival Pennzoil may be two other examples.
11We use the term “supplier” to represent a third party to the contract, who may be an actual supplier, a
manager, investor, partner, or other “upstream/downstream” participant in the ﬁrm’s activities, who provides
an input/service/investment that can be used by the ﬁrm. The contribution of this party is referred to as an
“input”.
12A fairly large number of empirical papers (including Titman and Wessels (1988), Qian (2003), Strebulaev and
Yang (2006), Strebulaev (2007), Kale and Shahrur (2007) and Banerjee, Dasugupta and Kim (2008), among oth-
ers) have examined the relationship between a ﬁrm and its primary stakeholders, such as suppliers and customers,
and studied the eﬀects of such relationships on the choice of capital structure. A major ﬁnding of these papers is
that, controlling for other factors, ﬁrms that produce durable goods, use specialized and non substitutable inputs
and depend heavily on suppliers or supply chains for procurement of such inputs, tend to use relatively smaller
amount of debt as a source of external ﬁnancing.
3junior creditors with considerable clout because they give rise to a hold-up problem. Namely,
they can behave opportunistically, by withholding inputs needed for uninterrupted production
and supply of ﬁnished goods and services. Such opportunistic behaviour can push the ﬁrm
towards bankruptcy when the payoﬀ to a coalition between the supplier and senior creditors,
under bankruptcy, exceeds the payoﬀ to a coalition with equity holders with no bankruptcy. In
other words, the presence of a senior claimant (debt holder) allows a junior creditor (supplier) to
engage in multilateral opportunistic behaviour, at a time when a ﬁrm is on the verge of ﬁnancial
distress. This may force equity holders to lose ownership, control and security beneﬁts associated
with the ﬁrm. Anticipating such an outcome, equity holders of ﬁrms that use such specialized,
non-substitutable and non-contractible inputs may avoid issuing debt altogether. But, more
generally (even if there is no corner solution), the marginal beneﬁts of issuing debt (such as tax
shields) will now be counterbalanced by the expected marginal cost of opportunistic behaviour.
Consequently, such ﬁr m sw i l li s s u el e s sd e b t . 13
In contrast to our model, the existing literature in the context of the buyer-supplier nexus14
shows that debt enhances bargaining power of equity holders, because it disciplines suppliers,
workers and other stakeholders via threat of bankruptcy. The conclusions reached in this litera-
ture hold when a ﬁrm issues public debt, so that its debt holders are numerous and disperse and
thus cannot communicate with suppliers/junior creditors. On the other hand, if debt holders
and suppliers are few in numbers and private (banks, for example), then they can communicate
and form an opportunistic coalition, thus representing a credible threat (of pulling the plug)
to equity holders. This paper shows that when stakeholder can form coalitions, the bargaining
advantage of debt may disappear.
In addition to the general conclusion that equity ﬁnancing becomes more attractive when fac-
ing multilateral opportunism, we also show that a ﬁrm’s capital structure decision is intrinsically
linked to contractual arrangement with its stakeholders. Speciﬁcally, our model gives rise to the
testable predictions that the debt-equity ratio will decrease with (i) the number of interdepen-
dent contracts, (ii) the diﬃculty of writing contracts with the suppliers, (iii) the importance of
the supplier of the non-contractible input in an opportunistic coalition, (iv) the diﬃculties in
achieving optimal franchising arrangements, (v) an increase in risk (in the ﬁrst-order-stochastic-
dominance, or mean-preserving-spread sense), (vi) a reduction in the ﬁrm’s size (as measured by
its assets) and (vii) the cost of supply adjustment facing the supplier.
Finally, it should be noted that, in general, the literature on the hold-up problem15 focuses
primarily on unilateral opportunistic behaviour, whereas this paper deals with the multilateral
13The hold-up problems, leading to multiparty opportunistic coalition against equity holders is relevant when a
ﬁrm is close to (but not in) bankruptcy. Situations like this have less bite if a ﬁrm is either in very good condition
so that it can fulﬁl its obligations to all clients, or if it is in very bad shape, which forces liquidation resulting in
payments to creditors according to seniority rules.
14See Brander and Spencer (1989), Brander and Lewis (1986), Appelbaum (1993), Bronars and Deree (1991),
Dasgupta and Sengupta (1993), Perotti and Spier (1993). In a recent paper, for example, Hennessy and Livdan
(2009) show that the optimal leverage is the outcome of the trade-oﬀ between equity holders’ increased bargaining
power due to higher debt and the overhang eﬀect of higher debt which exacerbates the incentive problem by
shrinking the set of feasible contracts to workers.
15See Hart (1995), Garvey and Swan,(1992).
4relationships in an incomplete contract setting. Moreover, while there are some studies of multi-
lateral contractual problems, the emphasis of this literature is either on strategic default16,o ro n
the probability of liquidation with complete contracts17 and not on the choice of capital structure
with incomplete contracts.18
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 outlines the time line of the model. In sections
3 and 4, we discuss the post-bankruptcy and multilateral bargaining games. Sections 5 and 6
present the supplier’s problem and the optimal contract with the supplier. Section 7 discusses
the contract with debt holder and the choice of capital structure. Section 8 provides a conclusion.
2 The Structure and Time-line of the Game
Consider a relationship between a ﬁrm and a supplier. The supplier provides an input service
that can be used in the production process. We assume that the input service is non-veriﬁable
and consequently, not contractible.
The ﬁrm’s gross proﬁts, R, are given by the function
R = R(K,y)+θ (1)
where K denotes capital services, y is the level of input service actually provided by the supplier
and θ is a random variable, capturing the uncertainty facing the ﬁrm. We assume that the
random variable θ, is distributed over the interval [m,n] a c c o r d i n gt ot h ed e nsity function g(θ),
where m<0 (and n is “suﬃciently” large) and a corresponding cumulative distribution G(θ).
The revenue function is assumed to be increasing and concave in K,y, with R(K,y) ≥ 0,f o r
all K,y. We also assume that R(K,0) > 0, for all K>0 (in other words, it is possible to
carry out production even with a “basic level” of the input, y =0 )a n dt h a t∂R(K,y)/∂y is
“suﬃciently” high when y =0 , but very low when y →∞(the usual Inada conditions). From
the monotonicity, it follows that R(K,y) > R(K,0), for all K>0,y>0. Finally, the ﬁrm’s
terminal assets, are given by R =[ R(K,y)+( 1− ρ)K]+θ ≡ R(K,y)+θ, where 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1 is
the depreciation rate (and where the price of K is normalized to one).19
Since we are not interested in explaining K, we simplify the notation by dropping it in the
following presentation (unless it is relevant); e.g., we will write R(K,y) as R(y).
16As in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996).
17See Detragiache, Garella and Guiso (2002) and Brunner and Krahnenz (2002).
18A very general discussion of multiple contracts is provided in Segal (1999). The paper examines and compares
alternative multiple contracts, oﬀered by a principle in the presence of externalities, and studies their eﬃciency
properties. Two other related papers are McAfee and Schwartz (1994), where multilateral opportunistic behaviour
in the context of vertical contracting is discussed, and Mailath and Postlewaite (1990), in which a bargaining
model with many agents is studied. However, the primary focus of these papers is on game-theoretic issues of
coalitional bargaining in a general economic framework as opposed to ours which focuses on the choice of capital
structure.
19A more general model will allow for both the ﬁrm and the supplier to have ex-ante and ex-post choice variables,
to be determined in the last stage of the bargaining game. Thus, in general, we can take, R = R(K,Y,x,y,θ),
where Y is ﬁxed ex-ante, but x and y are ”negotiable” ex-post.
5We consider a multi-stage contracting game of symmetric information20 with uncertainty.
The game involves a principal (equity holders) and two agents: debt holders and the supplier.21
2.1 Time-line
The time line, also described in Figure 1 below, is as follows.
• Stage 1:
In the ﬁrst stage, the ﬁrm (equity holder) makes its production and ﬁnancing decisions. The
production decision is captured by the choice of K. We are not concerned with this part of the
decision, so that for our purpose we can think of K as given. The ﬁnancing decision involves the
choice of capital structure and is summarized by the contract with debt holders. This contract
speciﬁes the level of debt, b, and the corresponding payment of, D (in other words, (D − b)/b is
the rate of interest). Equity is then given by e = K − b. The capital market is assumed to be
eﬃcient, in the sense that there are no borrowing constraints.
• Stage 2:
In the second stage, equity holders sign a contract with the supplier. They sign an incomplete
contract that speciﬁes that an “input” will be provided and in return the supplier will receive
as h a r e ,0 ≤ γ ≤ 1, of net proﬁts, after the production process is completed and proﬁts are
realized.22 In addition to proﬁt sharing, they also agree on a side payment, w,to be paid at the
signing of the contract. The contract, however, cannot specify precisely the amount (“nature”)
of the input that will be provided.
• Stage 3:
In stage 3, given the contract signed with equity holders, the supplier chooses the level of his
input, Y. We distinguish between the level of the input that was chosen by the supplier, Y, and
the level of the input that will actually be provided; y. The supplier’s costs are incurred at this
stage. In the next period, the cost of his ﬁrm speciﬁc input is, therefore, a sunk cost.
• Stage 4:
20The eﬀects of asymmetric information on the ﬁrm’s capital structure have been discussed in the literature
extensively (see Jensen and Meckling (1976), Leland and Pyle (1977)).
21In principle, it is possible to consider diﬀerent relationships, as long as: (i) there is at least one incomplete
contract, (ii) it is possible to form subcoalitions. The results would not be diﬀerent.
22It is, of course, possible to consider alternative contracts with the supplier. In general, the contract will
specify that the investor will receive some payment w(R + θ,D). To simplify matters, we take this as a share.
Alternatively, a sharing arrangement may not be possible, so the contract may provide for a ﬁxed payment. The
results with a ﬁxed payment are the same as the ones presented in this paper.
6In the “beginning” of stage four, uncertainty about θ is resolved (and is common knowledge).
Then, after the realization of θ, the actual level of the input to be supplied (y) and consequently
the ﬁrm’s solvency are determined, in a three-party bargaining/coalitional game (between equity
holders, debt holders and the supplier).23 The ﬁrm has to meet its legal obligations to claimants:
ap a y m e n to fD to debt holders and a share of proﬁts to the supplier. This bargaining game is
constrained by the realized state of the world, the previously determined contracts and the by
existing legal structure. Speciﬁcally, the threat points in this bargaining game and consequently
its outcome, are aﬀected by bankruptcy laws and in particular by the seniority of claims.24
Depending on the equilibrium coalitional structure (which in turn depends on the state of
the world and the legal structure), there are three possible outcomes to this bargaining game.
First, if the ﬁrm can meet all of its obligations we have solvency. In this case, the overall game
ends. On the other hand, if the ﬁrm’s terminal assets, R + θ ≥ 0, are insuﬃcient to meet its
obligations in full,25 the ﬁrm is in default and goes into bankruptcy.26 But, there are two possible
“types” of bankruptcy; strategic and non-strategic. Strategic bankruptcy occurs. Non-strategic
bankruptcy occurs if the ﬁrm cannot meet its obligation due to a bad state of the world rather
than opportunistic behaviour. That is, if even the supply of the input was internalized, the ﬁrm
would still go bankrupt. Strategic bankruptcy can occur even if the ﬁrm is viable, due to the
formation of an opportunistic coalition between the supplier and debt holders. In either case,
if the ﬁrm goes into bankruptcy, its assets are distributed in accordance with the seniority of
claims. We assume that debt holders are secured creditors (thus ﬁrst claimants), where their
claim can be applied against R + θ.27 The supplier is an unsecured creditor, whereas equity
holders are residual claimants.
• Stage 5:
If bankruptcy occurs in stage 4, debt holders and the supplier enter into a post-bankruptcy
bargaining in which the level of the input to be supplied is, again, renegotiated and the parties’
shares of the gains from trade are determined. We denote the post-bankruptcy renegotiated
input as y0 and assume that the supplier’s share of the gains from trade is 0 <β<1.
We now examine the subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium of this game.
23In general, the supplier’s share of proﬁts in this stage can (but does not have to) be diﬀerent from the
previously contracted share, γ.
24The bankruptcy law provides the ”guidelines” that govern this bargaining process. The constraints imposed
by the bankruptcy rules and the parties’ relative strength in the in the bargaining process, determine actual
payoﬀs. For example, according to the bankruptcy law in the US and Canada (See Altman (1983), Willes and
Willes (2003), White (1980), (1989)), secured creditors receive the saleable value of the assets which are subject
to security. If the value of the security is insuﬃcient to satisfy the claims, the secured creditor is entitled to claim
the remainder as an unsecured creditor. Unsecured assets are distributed, according to the US and Canadian
laws in the following order: (i) administrative costs, (ii) taxes, (iii) wages and rents, (iv) unsecured creditors, (v)
equity holders. If several claimants have the same priority, they are paid on a pro-rata basis.
25Note that we do not include the side payment as part of the ﬁrm’s assets.
26See Titman (1984), White (1989), for examples of discussions of the corporate bankruptcy decision. See
Aghion, Hart and Moore, (1998), for a discussion of eﬃcient bankruptcy procedures. See also Hart and Moore
(1998) for a model of default with renegotiations.
27Other types of securities, such as speciﬁc liens and mortgages yield similar results. The question of why
debtholders should be secured creditors is discussed, for example, in Stulz and Johnston, (1985).
73 Last Stage: Post Bankruptcy Bargaining
If bankruptcy occurred in stage 4 (the condition under which this happens will be discussed
below), debt holders and the supplier engage in post-bankruptcy bargaining in the last stage.
In this bargaining game, they renegotiate the input to be supplied, y0 (subject to the constraint
y0 ≤ Y )a n dt h ed i v i s i o no ft h eg a i nf r o mt r a d e 28. We assume that the supplier’s share is
exogenously given by 0 <β<1.
C o n s i d e rt h es o l u t i o nt ot h i sb a r g a i n i n gg a m e .T h et h r e a tp a y o ﬀs of the supplier and debt
holders are zero and R(0) + θ, respectively and, for any supply y0, the gain from trade is given
by R(y0) − R(0). Since the joint surplus, R(y0)+θ, is maximized at Y (which is determined in
stage 3): it clear that the bargaining solution must be such that y0 = Y. The supplier’s and debt
holders’ equilibrium payoﬀs, p(θ) and D(θ) are, therefore, given by:
p(θ)=β[R(Y ) − R(0)] (2)
D(θ)=R(0) + θ +( 1− β)[R(Y ) − R(0)]
Since bankruptcy has occurred, equity holders’ payoﬀsa r e
e(θ)=0 (3)
If bankruptcy does not occur the game ends in stage 4.
4 Stage 4: Multilateral Bargaining
The state of the world is revealed in the beginning of stage 4. Subsequently, the actual level of
input supplied, y ≤ Y (as opposed to Y, or y0) and consequently the parties’ payoﬀsa n dt h e
ﬁrm’s solvency are determined, in this stage, in a three-party bargaining game. Bankruptcy may,
or may not occurs in this stage. If the ﬁrm can meet its obligations, the game ends in stage 4.
If, on the other hand, the ﬁrm cannot meets its obligations, it goes into bankruptcy. Clearly,
bankruptcy may occur if the ﬁrm is not viable. But, as will now be shown, even a viable ﬁrm
may sometime be forced into bankruptcy by a strategic supplier/debt holders coalition. In either
case, if the ﬁrm goes into bankruptcy, the supplier and debt holders move to the post-bankruptcy
game in stage 5, as described above.
Let us examine the three-party bargaining game in stage 4. Deﬁne the following regions:
A
3 ≡ {(θ,D):R(K,0) + θ − D ≥ 0,m ≤ θ ≤ n}
A
1 ≡ {(θ,D,Y):R(K,Y )+θ − D ≤ 0,m ≤ θ ≤ n}
A
2 ≡ {(θ,D,Y):( θ,D,Y) / ∈ A
3 UA
1,m ≤ θ ≤ n}
For the problem to be meaningful and interesting, we assume that the three regions are not
empty. For example, these regions are shown in Figure 2 below, in (D,θ) space (given Y ).
28Note that, at this point the supplier has already made his production decision, Y (in stage 3), and his actual
supply decision, y, in stage 4. But, we assume that he can adjust his supply subject to the constraint y0 ≤ Y.
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3 if Y =0
The three regions above can now be written as:
A
3 ≡ {(θ,D):θ ≥ θ
3(D),m ≤ θ ≤ n}
A
1 ≡ {(θ,D,Y):θ ≤ θ
1(D),m ≤ θ ≤ n}
A
2 ≡ {(θ,D,Y):θ
1(D) ≤ θ ≤ θ
3(D),m ≤ θ ≤ n}
It is easy that, within region A3, bankruptcy cannot occur even if y =0is supplied, but within
region A1 bankruptcy occurs even if y = Y is supplied. Within these two regions, strategic
behaviour (forced bankruptcy) on the part of the supplier is, therefore, impossible. On the other
hand, within region A2, the supplier can force the ﬁrm into bankruptcy by not supplying all of
his investment.
To examine the outcome of the multilateral bargaining game in stage 4, we have to consider
the outcomes within the diﬀerent regions.
• Case I : (θ,D) ∈ A3 -S o l v e n c yR e g i o n
In this case, the ﬁrm can always meet all its obligations to the claimants, regardless of
how much of Y is actually supplied. If the supplier provides a “basic” input, y =0 , he gets
the contracted share γ[R(0) + θ − D], debt holders get D and equity holders get a residual of
(1−γ)[R(0)+θ −D]. But, by supplying y = Y, additional gains from trade of R(Y )−R(0)can
be divided between the supplier and equity holders. Since the cost of Y is sunk, it is clear that
y = Y maximizes joint surplus. The outcome of the bargaining game will, therefore, involve the
actual supply of y = Y and a division of the gains from trade. We assume that the supplier’s
ex-post share of the gains from trade in the bargaining game is γ[R(y) − R(0)]. In other words,
his ex-post and ex-ante shares are the same. This assumption can be amended without aﬀecting
any of the results.
Let actual receipts of the supplier, debt holders and equity holders in the bargaining game be
given by, p(θ),D (θ) and e(θ), respectively. Thus, in this region, we have y = Y and the parties’
receipts are given by:
9p(θ)=γ(R(0) + θ − D)+γ[R(Y ) − R(0)] = γ(R(Y )+θ − D)
D(θ)=D (6)
e(θ)=( 1 − γ)(R(0) + θ − D)+( 1− γ)[R(Y ) − R(0)] = (1 − γ)(R(Y )+θ − D)
• Case II: (θ,D,Y) ∈ A2
Within this region, the supplier can force the ﬁrm into bankruptcy by not supplying all of his
input.29 To determine whether it is indeed in the interest of the supplier to exercise his option to
force default, we have to compare his receipts if he forces bankruptcy with those when he does
not. We know that if he actually forces bankruptcy, he will move to post-bankruptcy bargaining
with debt holders in stage 5. His share of the gains from trade in post-bankruptcy bargaining is
0 <β<1. Namely, he will receive β[R(Y ) − R(0)].
W h a tw i l lb eh i sr e c e i p t sb ei fh ec a n ,b u tdoes not actually, force bankruptcy? Speciﬁcally,
does the mere ability to force bankruptcy, in itself, endow him with extra beneﬁts (in this
region)? To see this, note that the supplier is now in a powerful position since (i) he can force
bankruptcy and (ii) he is an indispensable party of any two-party coalition. We will now show
that consequently, this does indeed endow him (under some circumstances) with extra power in
this coalitional game and hence with extra beneﬁts.




nsb ≡ {(θ,D,Y):β[R(Y ) − R(0)] ≤ R(Y )+θ
2 − D, R(K,0) + θ − D ≤ 0,m ≤ θ ≤ n}
A
2
sb ≡ {(θ,D,Y):β[R(Y ) − R(0)] ≥ R(Y )+θ
2 − D, R(K,Y )+θ − D ≥ 0,m ≤ θ ≤ n}
Region A2
nsb represents a region where the supplier’s ability to force bankruptcy enables him to ex-
tract extra beneﬁts, even without actually forcing bankruptcy. This is a no-strategic-bankruptcy
(nsb) region. Region A2
sb represents a region where the supplier can force bankruptcy but, in
addition, he is better oﬀ actually forcing bankruptcy. Namely, this a is strategic-bankruptcy (sb)
region. Again, for the problem to be interesting, we assume that the nsb and sb regions are not
empty.
Let us now examine the outcomes within these two sub-regions.
• Case IIa: (θ,D,Y) ∈ A2
nsb - No-Strategic-Bankruptcy Region
The supplier can now force bankruptcy by withholding some of Y (see previous footnote).
Assuming that multilateral negotiations and binding pre-bankruptcy agreements between the
29Speciﬁcally, deﬁne the bankruptcy forcing level of investment, y(θ), given the state θ, by the solution to the
equation: R(y(θ)) + θ − D =0 . For any state of the world θ, if the supplier provides y<y (θ),t h eﬁrm defaults
on obligations to debtholders. On the other hand, if (within this range) y(θ) <y≤ Y is supplied, an additional
gain from trade can be obtained. Note that for θ ≥ θ
3 we cannot force bankruptcy, since Y (θ) ≤ 0, for all θ ≥ θ
3.
10supplier and debt holders about about post-bankruptcy payoﬀs are possible, and given the sup-
plier’s pivotal role as a coalition partner, the supplier can now extract the full amount over and
above the (legally constrained) receipts by debt holders in such a coalition: R(Y )+θ −D. This
is the full value of the coalition between equity holders and the supplier. In other words, the
supplier extracts all the value over and above his two rivals’ opportunity cost values of: D and
zero, respectively. Since there are no bankruptcy costs here, the results are the same whether
bankruptcy actually occurs or not. That is, the receipts by all three parties are the same whether
the coalition is between the supplier and equity holders (without default), or between the supplier
and debt holders.30
Thus, we have:
Theorem 1 For all (θ,D,Y) ∈ A2
nsb, the unique equilibrium of the game has y = Y and payoﬀs:
p(θ)=R(Y )+θ − D (7)
D(θ)=D
e(θ)=0
Proof. See Appendix I.
Theorem 1 suggests that the supplier’s pivotal role as a coalition partner and his ability to
force bankruptcy, in this region, enable him to extract all the surplus in excess of the legally
constrained receipts by debt holders (R(Y )+θ − D)31 without actually having to force bank-
ruptcy32.
• Case IIb: (θ,D,Y) ∈ A2
sb - Strategic Bankruptcy Region
Again, the supplier can force bankruptcy by withholding some of Y. But, since within this
region, we have β[R(Y )− R(0)] ≥ R(K,Y )+θ−D, he is better oﬀ actually forcing bankruptcy.
30As an alternative scenario, we can consider the case where the supplier and debt holders cannot engage in
pre-bankruptcy negotiations that lead to binding agreements about post-bankruptcy payoﬀs. Under this scenario,
the supplier’s threat point will be diﬀerent and hence the division of the surplus between him and equity holders
will also be diﬀerent. Speciﬁcally, the supplier’s threat payoﬀ is now what he gets in the post-bankruptcy
(rather than pre-bankruptcy) agreement, namely, β[R(Y ) − R(0)]. His payoﬀ will, therefore, be β[R(Y ) − R(0)]
+γ{R(Y )+θ − D − β[R(Y ) − R(0)]}, which consists of his threat point plus his share of the surplus (revenue,
net of his threat point and the payment to debt holders). Since within this region we have β[R(Y ) − R(0)]
≤ R(Y )+θ − D, he is, indeed, better oﬀ not forcing bankruptcy. In the following theorem we show that when
multilateral negotiations and binding pre-bankruptcy agreements between the supplier and debt holders about
about post-bankruptcy payoﬀs are possible, the supplier can extract extra surplus; in fact he can now extract the
full amount of the surplus R(Y )+θ−D. Except for the division of the surplus, the results under these alternative
scenario are the same.
31This is the full value of the coalition between equity holders and the supplier. In other words, the supplier
extracts all the surplus value over and above his two rivals’ opportunity costs, which are D and zero, respectively.
32Since there are no bankruptcy costs here and the coaltional agreements are binding post-bankruptcy, the
payoﬀs are the same whether bankruptcy actually occurs or not. That is, the receipts by all three parties are the
same whether the coalition is between the supplier and equity holders (without default), or between the supplier
and debtholders. It is, of course, possible to introduce costs of bankruptcy and “switching” management (from
equity to debtholders-supplier management). This will make the potential gains to the supplier, within this range,
smaller. His incentive to supply will, therefore, decrease. It is also well known (see Ravid (1988), Brander and
Lewis (1986)) that bankruptcy costs provide an incentive for equity ﬁnancing and we do not pursue this here.
11When he forces bankruptcy, his receipts, in post-bankruptcy bargaining with debt holders, will
be: β[R(Y ) − R(0)].
Thus, for (θ,D,Y) ∈ A2
sb, we have y = Y, and the parties’ receipts are given by:
p(θ)=β[R(Y ) − R(0)]
D(θ)=R(0) + θ +( 1− β)[R(Y ) − R(0)]
e(θ)=0
This case implies that, under some circumstances, due to opportunistic behaviour, the ﬁrm will
n o tb ea b l et op r e v e n tb a n k r u p t c y ,e v e ni fi ti sv i a b l e( i nt h es e n s et h a ti tc a ns u r v i v ei fY is
supplied). This result is reminiscent of Hart and Moore (1998), where the entrepreneur cannot
prevent foreclosure.
• Case III: (θ,D,Y) ∈ A1 - Non-strategic bankruptcy Region
In this case, the ﬁrm will always default on its obligations to debt holders, so that equity
holders are out of the picture. The supplier and debt holders, therefore, move to post-bankruptcy
bargaining. Assuming that the sharing rule does not depend on whether the ﬁrm went bankrupt,
or was forced into bankruptcy, the gains from trade and the outcome of bargaining will be the
same as in the A2
sb region. In other words, we the same result as in Case IIb33.
These regions are shown in Figure 2.
5 Stage 3: The Supplier’s Problem
Given the outcome of the bargaining game, the supplier’s problem is34
max
Y








β[R(Y ) − R(0)]g(θ)dθ+
Z θ3(D)
θ2(Y,D)
[R(Y )+θ − D]g(θ)dθ +
Z n
θ3(D)
γ[R(Y )+θ − D]g(θ)dθ (9)
δ ≡ 1
1+s and sis the opportunity cost rate of return.
33We are assuming that R(0) + θ ≥ 0. If we allow for the case where R(0) + θ<0, the result will be similar
except that now the gains from trade are R(Y )+θ − max[0,R (0) + θ]=R(Y )+θ, since here R(0) + θ ≤ 0.
34The supplier’s cost function is taken to be linear, but the results remain the same for any increasing and
convex cost function.














2(Y,D)]} + γ{1 − G[θ
3(D)]}
=( 1− γ)G[θ
3(D)] − (1 − β)G[θ
2(Y,D)] + γ (11)
is a “discount factor” that is applied to the present value of the marginal beneﬁts of Y. This
discount factor is simply the supplier’s expected share, which is the average of the shares in
diﬀerent states of the world. Being the supplier’s expected share, π must satisfy:
0 <π (K,D,Y,γ,β) ≤ 1, for all 0 <γ≤ 1, 0 <β < 1 (12)
Assuming that ∂R(0)/∂Y is high enough (we need
∂R(0)
∂Y > 1/[δπ(0)]), it follows that when the
input is zero we have: δ
∂R(0)
∂Y π(0) > 1. Assuming that E[p(θ)] is concave in Y 35 and given that






Since the supplier’s share in the post-bankruptcy bargaining will never be strictly equal to 1,
(β<1),t h eo n l yw a yt og e tπ =1is when γ =1and the probability of a forced bankruptcy (with
a supplier/debt holders coalition) is zero (G(θ
2)=0 ) .37 If, indeed, γ =1and the probability of
a coalition between the supplier and debt holders is zero, then we have π =1for any value of
β.Alternatively, given that β<1, we have π<1 if either γ<1, or the probability of a coalition
between the supplier and debt holders is strictly positive.38











∂Y ]. But ∂π
∂Y = g(θ
2)(β −1)2 ∂R(Y )
∂Y > 0. Thus,concavity of R(Y ) is not enough to
guaranty concavity of E[p(θ)].
36Notice that when the ﬁrm does not use debt, we have E[p(θ)] =
R n
m γ[R(Y )+θ]g(θ)dθ, hence π = γ and the
ﬁrst order condition is δ
∂R(Y )
∂Y γ =1 .
37A zero probability of a forced bankruptcy can only happen if θ
2(Y,D) ≤ m.
38It can be easily shown that under the alternative scenario (discussed in footnote 30) when the supplier and debt
holders cannot engage in pre-bankruptcy negotiations that lead to binding agreements about post-bankruptcy
payoﬀs and consequently the supplier’s payoﬀ is β[R(Y )− R(0)] +γ{R(Y )+θ−D−β[R(Y )− R(0)]}, the discount
factor becomes π(K,D,Y,γ,β) ≡ βG[θ
2(Y,D)] + (β + γ + βγ){G[θ
3(D)] − G[θ
2(Y,D)]} + γ{1 − G[θ
3(D)]}. So,
again, if β<1, the only way to get π =1is when γ =1and the probability of a forced bankruptcy is zero.
Note also that if the supplier cannot form a coalition with debt holders, we would have G[θ
2(Y,D)] = 0, hence,
π = γ +( 1− γ){1 − G[θ
3(D)]}. This is the usual incomplete contract problem and it can be resolved by setting
γ =1 , which implies that π =1 . Thus, in this case, the ﬁrst best solution can be achieved.
13Given the concavity of R,t h i si m p l i e st h a ti feither γ<1, or the probability of a supplier/debt
holders coalition is strictly positive (that is, when π<1), the supplier will choose a level of Y
that is too low. To see this, note that the Pareto optimal (or integrated ﬁrm) level of input, say
Y i, equates marginal beneﬁts and marginal costs:39 δ
∂R(Y i)











∂Y . Given concavity, this implies that, for all
π<1,w eh a v eY ∗ <Yi.
The supplier’s ﬁrst order condition, δ
∂R(Y ∗)
∂Y π(K,D,Y ∗,γ,β) − 1=0 , deﬁnes his incentive
compatibility constraint. Alternatively, it deﬁnes (implicitly) his input supply function, which












∂2J/∂Y 2 > 0 (15)
Thus, an increase an increase in the supplier’s share will increase Y ∗.
6 Stage 2: The Contract with the Supplier
In stage 2, after the contract with debt holders is signed, equity holders sign a contract with the
supplier. The contract with the supplier speciﬁes that he will provides his services and in return,
he will receive a share, γ, of proﬁts40 and a side payment of w will be paid at the signing of the
contract. The input service, however, is non-veriﬁable so that the parties cannot sign a contract
t h a ti sb a s e do ni t sa c t u a ll e v e l .
Consider the ﬁrm’s problem. Given the contract with debt holders, the outcomes of the








Equity holders choose a sharing arrangement, γ (and the ﬁx e dp a y m e n t )t h a tm a x i m i z e st h e
expected net present value of their receipts,
V ≡ δE[e(θ)] − e − w,
subject to the supplier’s participation and incentive compatibility constraints. If we deﬁne
E[p(θ)], evaluated at the optimal solution, Y ∗, as:
E[p
∗(θ)] ≡ E[p(θ)]|Y ∗
39S e ef o o t n o t e3 9b e l o w .
40There are several ways to deﬁne the assets to be shared. For simplicity we assume that they share net terminal
assets. Other arrangements yield similar results.
14The equity holders’ problem can be written as:
max
γ,w {δE[e(θ)] − e − w : δE[p
∗(θ)] − Y





∗,γ,β)=1 , 1 − γ ≥ 0}
Alternatively, instead of using the incentive compatibility constraint, we can simply use the
solution for Y ∗ and write the problem as:
max
γ,w {δE[e(θ)] − e − w : δE[p
∗(θ)] − Y
∗ + w ≥ 0,Y
∗ = Y
∗(K,D,γ,β) , 1 − γ ≥ 0} (18)
It is clear that the optimal solution does not leave any extra surplus to the supplier. In other





Plugging this into the expected net present value of equity, V, we get:
V = δ{R(Y
∗)+E(θ) − E[D
∗(θ)]} − e − Y
∗ (19)













Let the optimal contract be given by (γ∗,w ∗). Then, it is easy to show that:
Proposition 2 The optimal contract involves a franchise arrangement; γ∗ =1 , a n daf r a n c h i s e
fee w∗ = −δE[p∗(θ)]|γ=1 + Y ∗1, where Y ∗1 ≡ Y ∗(K,D,γ =1 ,β).
Proof. See Appendix II41.
Finally, since we will need to use the value of the solution to above problem, in the de-
termination of the optimal contract with debt holders, let us deﬁne maximum value function
as:
V
∗1 ≡ V (γ
∗)=V (1) = δ{R(Y
∗1)+E(θ) − E[D
∗1(θ)]} − e − Y
∗1 (21)
where E[D∗1(θ)] ≡ E[D∗(θ)]|Y ∗=Y ∗1 with θ
2∗1 ≡ θ
2(K,Y ∗1,D).
41Thus, if the ﬁrm does not use debt, we have π =1 , i.e., the ﬁr s tb e s ts u p p l yo fY.
157 The Contract with Debt holders:
In the ﬁrst stage, equity holders sign a contract with debt holders. The contract speciﬁes the
level debt, b, and the corresponding payment, D.42 Given the outcomes in stages 2,3,4 and
5, equity holders’ receipts are given by V ∗1 in equation (21) (i.e., it is given by V, evaluated




∗1(θ)] − b ≥ 0. (22)
This participation constraint deﬁnes the market debt supply function.
Equity holders choose a contract with debt holders to maximize the expected net present
value of their receipts, V ∗1, subject to debt holders’ participation constraint and the supplier’s
incentive compatibility constraint, which is given by δ
∂R(Y ∗1)
∂Y π(K,D,Y ∗1,1,β)=1 . Note that
since we used the supplier’s participation constraint in the derivation of V ∗1, we do not need to
worry about it; its satisfaction has already been imposed. Furthermore, the optimal contract
with the supplier (γ∗ =1 ,w ∗ = −δE[p∗(θ)]|Y ∗1 + Y ∗1 has also already been taken into account
in the deﬁnition of V ∗1 in equation (21).











∗1,1,β)=1 ,δ E [D
∗1(θ)] − b ≥ 0}
Again, it is clear that the optimal solution does not leave extra surplus to debt holders. In
other words, their participation constraint will hold with strict equality:
δE[D
∗1(θ)] = b (23)
If we plug this strict participation constraint, (23), into the expression for V ∗1, we get the
expected net present value of equity as:
δ[R(K,Y
∗1)+E(θ) − (ρ + s)K] − Y
∗1 ≡
δ[R(K,Y
∗1)+E(θ) − (1 + s)K] − Y
∗1
which is simply the expected net present value of the ﬁrm: the expected value of proﬁts, less the
true costs of capital and supplier services.










∗1,1,β)=1 ,δ E [D
∗1(θ)] = b, b ≤ K
42Note that, for any given K, the choice of b also determines equity, e.
16where there is no need to consider e explicitly, since it is given by: e = K − b (and K is taken
as given).
It is convenient to proceed by ﬁrst solving the incentive compatibility and participation con-
straints for D and Y ∗1in terms of b, thus eliminating these two constraints. The two constraints
are F ≡ δ
∂R(Y ∗1)
∂Y π(K,D,Y ∗1,1,β)−1=0and B(K,b,D,Y ∗1,β) ≡ δE[D∗1(θ)]−b =0 . Ignoring





Let the solution to these two constraints be given by D = e D(b) and e Y (b).43 The equity holders’
problem can, therefore, be re-written as:
max
b
{δ[R(e Y (b)) + E(θ) − (1 + s)K] − e Y (b):b ≤ K} (25)
Deﬁne the Lagrangian by:
L ≡ δ[R(e Y (b)) + E(θ) − (1 + s)K] − e Y (b)+μ(K − b)
where μ is the Lagrangian corresponding to the inequality constraint, b ≤ K. The Kuhn-Tucker



























= μ(K − b)=0 (26)
μ ≥ 0
L e tt h es o l u t i o nt h ep r o b l e ma b o v eb eg i v e nb y :{b Y (K,β), b D(K,β),b b(K,β)}.
We can now show that:
Proposition 3 With the optimal capital structure, the probability of an opportunistic forced
bankruptcy is zero.
43Appendix III conﬁrms that the conditions for solving for e D(b) and e Y (b) (implicit function theorem) are
satisﬁed.
44We assume that the required curvature conditions are satisﬁed.
17Proof. From the supplier’s ﬁrst order condition (13) it follows that for any optimal solution (for
the supplier), e Y (b) > 0, we have: δ
∂R(h Y (b))
∂Y e π(b)=1 , where e π(b) ≡ 1 −(1 − β)G[e θ
2
(b)] (since the
optimal supplier’s share is γ∗ =1 , and where e θ
2
(b) ≡ θ
2∗1[e D(b), e Y (b)]. We prove the proposition
by contradiction. First, note that (i) when debt is zero, the probability of forced bankruptcy is
zero too, (ii) for the probability of forced bankruptcy to be strictly positive, debt itself must be
strictly positive too. Now, suppose that we have a solution at b>0, such that at b the probability
of forced (i.e., opportunistic) bankruptcy is strictly positive. That is, we have G[e θ
2
(b)] > 0. But,
since β<1, we must have e π(b) < 1, which implies that: δ
∂R(h Y (b))
∂Y −1 > 0. However, as is shown
in Appendix III, in this case, the eﬀect of an increase in b on e Y (b) is strictly negative:
dh Y (b)
db < 0.





db − μ<0. But, the Kuhn-Tucker
conditions then imply that we must have b =0 , which is a contradiction. Hence, the optimal
solution cannot be at a debt level, b, for which G[e θ
2
(b)] > 0. We, therefore, conclude that with
the optimal capital structure, say b b(K,β), the probability of an opportunistic forced bankruptcy
is zero: G[e θ
2
(b b(K,β))] = 0.
Proposition 1 shows that the ﬁrm will choose its optimal level of debt to be suﬃciently low,
so that the probability of strategic bankruptcy is zero. Note that since θ
1 <θ
2 for all Y> 0,
this also implies that the optimal capital structure ensures that the probability of non-strategic
bankruptcy (and its consequent post-bankruptcy debt holders/supplier coalition) is also zero.
The proposition above gives us an important property of the optimal capital structure. But,
we want to go further and ﬁnd out what the optimal capital structure will actually be. As
is clear, the answer to this question will, generally, depend on the characteristics of the model.
More speciﬁcally, it depends on whether the probability of an opportunistic strategic bankruptcy




In other words, b is the level of debt which reduces the probability of an opportunistic strategic
bankruptcy to zero. Alternatively, since θ is distributed over the interval [m,n], we can simply




By deﬁnition, the probability of strategic bankruptcy is zero for all levels of b below b :
G[e θ
2
(b)] = 0, for all b ≤ b
Now, plugging the deﬁnition of θ
2 ( f r o me q u a t i o n( 4 ) )i n t oe q u a t i o n( 2 7 ) ,w ec a nr e - w r i t et h e
deﬁnition of b as:
e D(b) − (1 − β)R[K, e Y (b)] − βR(K)=m
Thus, b is a function of m,K and β and can be written as:
b = b(m,K,β)










In other words, as the distribution shifts up, or when K increases, the the highest value of debt
such that the probability of a strategic bankruptcy is still zero increases. On the other hand,
when the supplier’s share in post-bankruptcy bargaining increases, the highest value of debt such
that the probability of a strategic bankruptcy is still zero decreases.
In general, however, we do not know whether b is positive or not. As the comparative statics
results above indicate, this depends on the parameters of the problem. For example, for a
suﬃciently high value of m we will have a positive b (this case is shown in Figure 2), but for
low values of m, b may be negative. Let us, therefore, deﬁne the set Z as the set of parameters
(m,K,β) over which b>0:
Z ≡ {(m,K,β):b>0}
We can now address the question of what the optimal capital structure will actually be. This
is given by the following proposition:
Proposition 4 The ﬁrm’s optimal capital structure, b b(K,β), is given by:
b b(K,β)=0 if b ≤ 0,i . e . ,if (m,K,β) / ∈ Z
b b(K,β) ∈ [0,b] if b>0,i . e . ,if (m,K,β) ∈ Z
Proof. The previous proposition implies that the optimal solution cannot be at a debt level,
b, for which G[e θ
2
(b)] > 0. Thus, if b ≤ 0, we must have a solution with zero debt (any strictly
positive debt will yield G[e θ
2
(b)] > 0).46 But if b>0, we cannot have a solution for values of debt
which are strictly higher than b. On the other hand, in this case, all values of debt which are
(weakly) below b will also yield G[e θ
2
(b)] = 0. Thus, in this case, the ﬁrm is indiﬀerent between
all debt levels between zero and b. Within this range the value of the ﬁrm is independent of its
capital structure: this is a Modigliani-Miller-range.
The results in the two propositions above provide another interpretation of the ﬁrm’s use of
its capital structure. By limiting, or even some time avoiding the use of debt altogether, the
ﬁrm eliminates the possibility of an opportunistic coalition. In doing so, it neutralizes the fact
that it cannot control the outcome of an opportunistic supplier-debt holders coalition. From
the deﬁnition of π (in equation (11)), it is clear that a ﬁrm whose level of debt, b, is such that
b>max{0,b}, cannot achieve the ﬁr s tb e s to u t c o m ee v e ni fγ =1 , because (i) there is a positive
probability of a supplier/debt holders coalition and (ii) it cannot control the outcome (shares) in
such a coalition. Control over the outcome of a potential post-bankruptcy supplier/debt holders
45This follows immediately from the deﬁnition of b and the fact that dY/db < 0 and dD/db > 0, as is shown in
Appendix III.
46Note that at b =0 , we have K − b>0, so that μ =0 . Moreover, when no debt is used and with the optimal
contract with the supplier (γ =1 ) ,w eh a v eπ =1and for all Y> 0 the supplier’s ﬁrst order condition (13)
becomes δ
∂R(Y )
∂Y − 1=0 . Thus, the Kuhn-Tucker condition above becomes: ∂L
∂b|b=0 =0 .
19coalition requires an ex-ante contract between equity holders and the supplier, which speciﬁes
the ex-post sharing rule in a post-bankruptcy supplier/debt holders coalition. This does not
seem reasonable.47 By choosing a level of debt which is not higher than max{0,b},t h eﬁrm
neutralizes the costs of such a coalition. This is accomplished by reducing the probability of such
a coalition to zero. This implies that rather than using debt to discipline the supplier, the ﬁrm
uses its capital structure to avoid opportunistic coalitions, thus providing incentives to supply the
correct level of input. The ﬁr s tb e s tl e v e lo fi n p u t( r e a c h e dw h e nδ ∂R
∂Y =1 )can only be achieved
if π =1 48. Since ∂π
∂D < 0, the discount factor can be increased to its highest possible value (of
1), by reducing debt to levels that do not exceed max{0,b}.N o t i c et h a ti fmax{0,b} =0 , this
implies that the ﬁrm will be fully equity ﬁnanced. On the other hand, if max{0,b} = b, the level
of debt may be strictly positive, but indeterminate within the Modigliani-Miller-range [0,b].
T h ec o n c l u s i o nt h a tt h eﬁrst best solution can be reached follows from the assumptions that:
(i) the participation of debt holders is not necessary and (ii) it is possible to set the share, γ, to
one. Consider the ﬁrst assumption. In our model, equity and debt are perfect substitutes in the
generation of proﬁts (in the R function). In many cases, however, the services of third parties
may not be perfect substitutes. In fact, the participation of third parties may even be required.
Under such circumstances, it may not be possible, or desirable, to reduce the participation of
third parties to low enough levels that eliminate the possibility of strategic bankruptcy. When
this happens, the ﬁrst best solution will not be achieved. Furthermore, often there may be other
motives for using debt. For example, with corporate taxation, the tax beneﬁts of debt ﬁnancing
may be suﬃciently high to oﬀset the strategic considerations identiﬁed above. In such a case,
the optimal level of debt may be greater than max{0,b}. Under these circumstances, the ﬁrm
may not be able to elicit the ﬁrst best level of input. As for the second assumption, it may not
always be possible, or desirable to set γ to one.49 If this cannot be done, the ﬁr s tb e s ts o l u t i o n
cannot be achieved. This is, of course, the standard result, given the non-contractibility.
Finally, it is worth summarizing the general predictions and empirical implications of the
model.
• First, our model identiﬁes a new cost of debt ﬁnancing. This new cost is due to two factors:
— (i) the possibility of opportunistic behaviour (G(θ
2∗1) > 0),
47It also does not seem reasonable that equity holders will be able to include this as part of their contract with
debtholders.
48The integrated ﬁrm’s problem is given by: maxY,bV ≡ δ{R(Y )+E(θ)−(s+ρ)K}−Y .w h e r eY is deﬁned by
the ﬁrst order condition: δ
∂R(Y )
∂Y =1 . Since V does not depend on b, we have the usual Modigliani-Miller result
that the value of the ﬁrm does not depend on its capital structure.
49For example, (i) there may be additional sources of incompleteness/imperfection, (ii) there may be insurance
considerations (with a risk averse supplier), (iii) the participation of equity holders is required (or desirable)
because their “input” is not perfectly transferable, (iv) proﬁts are not veriﬁable, so that proﬁt sharing is prob-
lematic. Even when we have an ex-ante agreement with γ =1 , the ﬁr s tb e s ts o l u t i o nm a yn o tb ea c h i e v e di f
the ﬁrm retains some residual authority (for example, if it can still block/refuse some Y ), so that re-negotiations
occur in the last stage. This issue is related to the question of what is a ﬁrm. It will not be pursued here. For a
discussion of this issue, see for example, Hart (1995) Grossman and Hart (1986), Hart and Moore (1998), Tirole,
(1990).
20— (ii) the ﬁrm cannot control the contract of a potential post-bankruptcy supplier/debt
holders coalition (it cannot control the value of β).
Due to this new cost, the ﬁrm faces a new consideration that tends to limits its use of
debt. Since, in general, there are other motives for using debt, our conclusion simply implies
that under these conditions, the debt-equity ratio will tend to be lower. At the same time,
it is important to remember that is the incompleteness of the contract with the supplier that
facilitates opportunistic behaviour in the ﬁrst place.
In addition to the prediction above, our model also has the following implications:
• As the ﬁrm’s contacts become more complex (in the sense that they involve a greater
number of interdependent incomplete contracts), the probability of opportunistic behaviour
tends to increase and as a result, the cost of debt ﬁnancing will increase, leading to a
decrease in the debt-equity ratio. To test this prediction, one would need to examine the
eﬀects of changes in an appropriately deﬁned and calculated measure of complexity on
the debt-equity ratio. It is interesting to note that this result is related to the literature
on bilateral versus multilateral cooperation. The consensus in this literature is that, in
general, it is easier to achieve bilateral than multilateral cooperation (because the former
is less “costly” to achieve and sustain).50 This is the equivalent to the result here, that
multilateral opportunistic behaviour is more costly.
• As the party whose contract is incomplete (in our case the supplier) becomes stronger (more
valuable) in an opportunistic coalition, his share in such a coalition will tend to increase (β
tends to be larger). As a result, again, the cost of debt ﬁnancing will increase, leading to a
decrease in the debt-equity ratio. To test this prediction, one would need to examine the
eﬀects of changes in an appropriately deﬁned and calculated measure of bargaining power51
on the debt-equity ratio.52
• Since it is the incompleteness of the contract with the supplier that facilitates opportunistic
behaviour, it is clear that the more diﬃcult it is to write contracts with the supplier (in
our example), the greater the chances of opportunistic behaviour, hence the cost of debt
ﬁnancing increases and consequently, the debt-equity ratio will be lower.
• A similar implication will result from greater diﬃculties in achieving optimal franchising
arrangements.
• If the adjustment costs (of changing Y ) facing the supplier decrease, opportunistic behav-
iour becomes easier and hence more costly to the ﬁrm. As a result, the debt-equity ration
will decrease.
50See Grieco (1990) and Pahre (1994).
51As is done in the unions power bargaining literature, for example.
52Both of the above predictions (the eﬀects of greater complexity, or power) may be consistent with the results
in Bolton and Scharfstein (1996), Detragiache, Garella and Guiso, (2002) and Brunner and Krahnenz (2002),
since the reduction in the debt equity ratio (holding everything else ﬁxed), tends to reduce the probability of
default
21• From the comparative statics results in equation (28), it follows that the probability of
opportunistic behaviour and hence its cost tend to decrease with the ﬁrm’s assets (with K).
The implication is, therefore, that the debt-equity ratio will increase with its size (as
captured by K).
• From the comparative statics results in equation (28), it also follows that the probability
of opportunistic behaviour and hence its cost tend to increase when the distribution of
θ becomes less (ﬁr s to r d e r )s t o c h a s t i c a l l yd o m i n a n t ,o rw h e ni tb e c o m er i s k i e r( i nt h e
mean preserving spread sense). The implication is, therefore that the debt-equity ratio will
decrease with these two types of increase in risk.
• Finally, there may be implications regarding the likelihood of governmental bailouts (as
in the Skeena case that was mentioned in the introduction) and hence strategic capital
structure and default decisions. For example, if we add labour as one of the aﬀected
parties, loses from a breakup due to a defectingc o a l i t i o nm a y ,d e p e n d i n go nt h ep o l i t i c a l
environment, make it more likely for the government to provide a bailout (this possibility
will, of course, be taken into account by the parties involved).
8C o n c l u s i o n :
This paper considers the eﬀects of multilateral opportunistic behaviour on the ﬁrm’s capital
structure. We consider a multi-party contract between equity holders, debt holders and a provider
of a non-contractible input. We show that with multiple parties, the contract with the supplier
becomes more incomplete, because the ﬁrm cannot, generally, avoid opportunistic coalitions and
it cannot control the terms of the contract in such potential supplier/debt holders coalitions. This
identiﬁes a new cost of debt ﬁnancing. A higher debt-equity ratio increases the probability of an
opportunistic coalition, thus increasing the costs of opportunistic behaviour. In fact, by limiting
its use of debt ﬁnancing, the ﬁrm can avoid the costs of opportunistic coalitions altogether.
Thus, in the absence of all other motives for using debt, the ﬁrm will reduce its debt to a level
that ensures that the probability of opportunistic coalitions is zero. Since, in general, there are
other motives for holding debt, our conclusion simply implies that under these conditions, the
debt-equity ratio will tend to be lower.
We also ﬁnd that by choosing a level of debt that reduces the probability of opportunistic
coalitions to zero, the ﬁrm provides the supplier with incentives to supply the correct level of
the ﬁrm-speciﬁc input. Speciﬁcally, if the ﬁrm can be franchised (without any residual authority
to equity holders), such level of debt yields a ﬁrst best outcome. On the other hand, if the
participation of debt holders is (i) required, (ii) not a perfect substitute for equity, or (iii)
desirable for other reasons, the ﬁrst best solution may not be possible to achieve. Similarly, if
the ﬁrm cannot be franchised, the ﬁr s tb e s ts o l u t i o nc a n n o tb ea c h i e v e d .
The results in this paper suggest that, in general, the ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio will decrease
with the number of interdependent incomplete contracts, the importance of the provider of
the non-contractible input in an opportunistic coalition, the diﬃculty of writing contracts with
22the supplier, the diﬃculties in achieving optimal franchising arrangements and certain types of
increased risk. On the other hand, the ﬁrm’s debt-equity ratio will increase with its size and the
cost of adjustment facing the supplier.
9 Appendix
I. Proof of theorem 1:
First, remember that we assume that the supplier and debt holders can engage in pre-
bankruptcy negotiations that lead to binding agreements about post-bankruptcy payoﬀs. Under
this scenario, the supplier’s threat point is the post-bankruptcy payoﬀ that can be agreed on in
pre-bankruptcy negotiations with debt holders.
Now, since R(Y )+θ>R (0) + θ, it is clear that the only possible equilibrium outcome will
have y = Y> 0. But, in this region, for all outcomes with y = Y> 0,t h eﬁrm is not in
default, so that debt holders must be paid their full claim of D. Now, consider any outcome with
y = Y> 0, in which the ﬁrm was not actually forced into bankruptcy. Since the ﬁrm is not in
default it must pay debt holders their full claim of D, but it has no reason to pay more than
D. The amount left to divide between supplier and equity holders is, therefore, R(Y )+θ − D.
Af e a s i b l ed i v i s i o nr e q u i r e st h a ti ta d d su pt oR(Y )+θ − D. Now, consider a feasible division
in which the supplier does not receive the full amount of R(Y )+θ − D. For example, take
p(θ)=λ[R(Y )+θ − D] and e(θ)=( 1− λ)[R(Y )+θ − D], where 0 ≤ λ<1. This cannot be
an equilibrium division since the supplier can break away and form a coalition with debt holders
in which the division is, for example, p(θ)=λ[R(Y )+θ − D]+ .5(1 − λ)[R(Y )+θ − D] and
D(θ)=D+ .5(1−λ)[R(Y )+θ −D]. This outcome is better for both and adds up to R(Y )+θ,
so it is feasible for a debt holders/supplier coalition.
Similarly, take any division of R(Y )+θ between the supplier and debt holders in a debt
holders/supplier coalition, in which the supplier does not receive the amount of R(Y )+θ − D.
For example, take the division p(θ)=R(Y )+θ − D − q and D(θ)=D + q. This division is
feasible since it adds up to R(Y )+θ. But, it cannot survive since the supplier can do better in
a coalition with equity holders in which the division is, for example, p(θ)=R(Y )+θ − D − .5q
and e(θ)=.5q. This outcome is better for both and adds up to R(Y )+θ − D, so it is feasible
for an equity holder/supplier coalition. Thus, in this region, the only possible outcome is with
y = Y> 0 and receipts of: p(θ)=R(Y )+θ − D, e(θ)=0 ,D (θ)=D. ¥
II. Proof of Proposition 1:
Plugging in the supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint, we obtain the corresponding
Lagrangian as: L(K,D,Y ∗(K,D,γ,β),γ,β) ≡ V + φ(1 − γ)=δ{R(Y ∗)+E(θ) −E[D∗(θ)]}
−e − Y ∗+ φ(1 − γ) where φ is the Lagrangians of the share constraint. The Kuhn-Tucker
conditions are, therefore, given by:53 ∂L
∂γ = ∂V
∂γ − φ ≤ 0 ≤ γ and ∂L
∂φ =1− γ ≥ 0 ≤ φ, where the
notation ∂L
∂z ≤ 0 ≤ z is used to denote: ∂L
∂z ≤ 0 , ∂L
∂zz =0 ,and z ≥ 0. But, from the deﬁnition of











∂γ . But, from the
deﬁnition of π we have: 1−(1−β)G(θ
2∗
)−π =( 1−α)(1−G(θ
3) > 0, so that 1−(1−β)G(θ
2∗
) >π .
53We assume that the required curvature conditions are satisﬁed.
23We also showed above that ∂Y ∗
∂γ > 0. This implies that: ∂V
∂γ = δ
∂R(Y ∗)






∂Y π ∂Y ∗
∂γ = ∂Y ∗
∂γ > 0.(since δ
∂R(Y ∗)
∂Y π =1from the ﬁrst order condition for the supplier’s
problem in equation (13)). Now, from the Kuhn-Tucker conditions we know that if γ<1 we
have φ =0 . But since ∂V
∂γ > 0, we have ∂L
∂γ > 0. In other words, if γ<1,V can be increased by
increasing γ as much as possible. Hence we cannot have a solution at γ<1. We must have a
solution where γ =1 , so that φ>0 and then ∂L
∂γ = ∂V
∂γ −φ =0 . The optimal solution, therefore,
involves a franchise arrangement with γ =1 .
III. Solution and Comparative Statics for Y ∗1 and D :
To calculate the eﬀects of a change in b on e Y (b), we must take into account that the two
constraints, F(D,Y ∗1)=0and B(b,D,Y ∗1)=0 , must hold simultaneously. Thus, D and
Y ∗1(D) are interdependent. But, these two equations are simply the debt holders’ strict par-
ticipation constraint, δE[D∗1(θ)] − b =0 , and the supplier’s incentive compatibility constraint
δ
∂R(Y ∗1)
∂Y π(K,D,Y ∗1,1,β)−1=0 , which is simply his ﬁrst order condition, evaluated at Y = Y ∗1,
















where, Bb ≡ ∂B
∂b = −1,B D ≡ ∂B
∂D = δ(1 − G(θ
2∗
)) > 0, JYD ≡ ∂2J





∂Y = δ(1 − β)
R θ2∗
m R0(Y ∗1)g(θ)dθ > 0 and JYY ≡ ∂2J
∂Y 2 < 0, by the concavity of E[p(θ)].













where |X| is the determinant of the matrix in (29). The overall eﬀect of an increase in debt is
to increases D, which in turn decreases Y ∗1.55
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